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Article 7

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Douglas Laycock*
The proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act1 (RFRA)
is a legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith: which held that federal courts
cannot protect the exercise of religion from formally neutral
and generally applicable laws. I n effect, the Court held that
every American has a right to believe in a religion, but no right
to practice it. Religion cannot be singled out for discriminatory
regulation, but it is f d y subject to the entire body of secular
regulation.
In a pervasively regulated society, Smith means that
religion will be pervasively regulated. I n a society where
regulation is driven by interest group politics, Smith means
that churches will be embroiled in endless political battles with
secular interest groups. In a nation that sometimes claims to
have been founded for religious liberty, Smith means that
Americans will suffer for conscience.
RFRA would greatly ameliorate these consequences. The
bill would e n a d a statutory version of the Free Exercise
Clause. The bill can work only if it is as broad as the Free
Exercise Clause, establishing the fundamental principle of
religious liberty and leaving particular disputes to further
litigation.
Introduced with bipartisan sponsorship in both Houses of
Congress, supported by President Clinton, and endorsed by its
most influential former opponent, the United States Catholic
Conference, RFRA may finally be on the way to passage after
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and Associate Dean for
Research, The University of Texas Law School. The author participated in the
drafting of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and testified in support of the
Act before committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
S. 578 & H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis
1.
Library, BLTEXT File.
2.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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three years of deadlock. This article reviews the need for
RFRA, some questions about its interpretation, the disputes
that have delayed its enactment for so long, and the
constitutional source of congressional power to enact the bill.

The founding generation of Americans had a vision of a
society in which religion would be entirely voluntary and
entirely free. People of all faiths and of none would be welcome.
Minority religions would be entitled not merely to grudging
toleration, but to freely and openly exercise their religion. Even
in their largely unregulated society, the Founders understood
that the free exercise of religion sometimes required religious
exemptions from formally neutral laws.3 Guarantees of free
exercise and disestablishment were written into our
fundamental law in state and federal constitutions. The
simultaneous American innovation of judicial review made
those guarantees legally enforceable.
The religion clauses represent both a legal guarantee of
religious liberty and a political commitment to religious liberty.
The religion clauses made America a beacon of hope for
religious minorities throughout the world. The extent of
religious pluralism in this country, and of legal and political
protections for religious minorities, is probably unsurpassed in
human experience. Religious liberty is one of America's great
contributions to civilization.
But a counter-tradition also runs through American
history; we have not always lived up to our ideals. There has
been religious intolerance and even religious persecution. The
New England theocracy expelled dissenters, executed Quaker
missionaries who returned, and, most infamously, perpetrated
the Salem witch trials. Colonial Virginia imprisoned Baptist
ministers for preaching without a license. American
slaveowners totally suppressed African religion among the
slaves, in what one historian has called "the African spiritual
holo~aust."~
Hostility to Catholics produced anti-Catholic political
movements, mob violence, and church burnings in the

Michael W. M c C o ~ e u ,The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
3.
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1466-73 (1990).
JON BUTLER,AWASHIN A SEAOF FAITH 129-63 (1990).
4.
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nineteenth century. Catholic children were beaten for refusing
to read the Protestant Bible in public schools. In the 1920s, the
Ku Klux Klan and other Nativist groups pushed through a law
in Oregon requiring all children to attend public schools; the
effect would have been to close the Catholic school^.^
The Mormons fled from New York, to Ohio, to Missouri, to
Illinois, to Utah. They were driven off their lands in Missouri
by a combination of armed mobs and state militia. Their
prophet was murdered by a mob while he was in the custody of
the State of Illinois. The federal government prosecuted
hundreds of Mormons for polygamy, it imposed test oaths that
denied Mormons the right to vote, and finally it dissolved the
Mormon Church and codiscated its property. The Supreme
Court upheld all of these laws in a series of cases in the late
nineteenth centuq?
From the late 1930s to the early 1950s, towns all over
America tried to stop the Jehovah's Witnesses from
proselytizing. These towns enacted a remarkable variety of
ordinances, most of which were eventually struck down. The
Supreme Court's decision in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis,' upholding the requirement that Jehovah's Witnesses
salute the flag, triggered a nationwide outburst of private
violence against the Witnesses.' Jehovah's Witness children
were beaten on American school grounds?
This thumbnail sketch of religious intolerance in American
history is relevant to RFRA for two reasons. First, history
shows that even in America government cannot always be
trusted t o protect religious liberty. Judicial enforcement of free
exercise is not foolproof either, but it is an important additional
safeguard.
This history of religious intolerance is also relevant in a
more specific way: formally neutral, generally applicable
laws-the kind that raise no constitutional issue after Smithwere central to three of the worst episodes of religious
persecution in our history. The law that would have closed all
the Catholic schools in Oregon was a formally neutral,
5. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
6. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United
States, 136 US. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
7. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
OF THEIR CONVICTIONS
22-23,31 (1988).
8. PETERIRONS, THE COURAGE
9. Id. at 30; see also id. at 33.
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generally applicable law. The polygamy law that underlay
much of the Mormon persecution was a formally neutral,
generally applicable law. The flag salute law invoked against
Jehovah's Witnesses was a formally neutral, generally
applicable law.
The Supreme Court upheld the polygamy law in Reynolds
v. United States.'' It upheld the flag salute law in Gobitis,
although it later struck down a similar law under the Free
Speech Clause." Reynolds and Gobitis are the two precedents
on which the Court principally relied in Smith; the Court was
simply oblivious to the shameful historical episodes of which
these cases were a part. The law closing Catholic schools was
struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,12 a decision cast in
serious doubt by Smith. If Pierce survives, it rests on a n
unenumerated right of parents to educate their children13-a
precarious base indeed.
In only one of these three episodes was the formally
neutral law originally enacted for the purpose of persecuting a
religious minority: The law closing private schools in Oregon
was enacted to harm the Catholics. But polygamy laws were
not enacted to get the Mormons, and flag salute laws were not
enacted to get the Jehovah's Witnesses. These laws were
originally enacted for legitimate reasons, but when they were
enforced against religious minorities, they fanned the flames of
persecution.
Congress can find as a fact that formally neutral, generally
applicable laws have repeatedly been the instruments of
religious persecution, even in America. Formally neutral laws
can lead to persecution for a simple reason: Once government
demands that religious minorities conform their behavior to
secular standards, there is no logical stopping point to that
demand. Conscientious resistance by religious minorities
sometimes inspires respectful tolerance and exemptions, but
sometimes it inspires religious hatred and determined,
systematic efforts to suppress the religious minority.

I mention the history of religious persecution because that
10.
11.
12.
13.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
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possibility cannot be assumed away. But deliberate persecution
is not the usual problem in this country. Religious
organizations and believers can lose the right to practice their
faith for a whole range of reasons: because their practice
offends some interest group that successfully insists on a
regulatory law with no exceptions, because the secular
bureaucracy is indifferent to their needs, or because the
legislature was unaware of their existence and failed to provide
an exemption. Some interest groups and individual citizens are
aggressively hostile to particular religious teachings, or t o
religion in general. Others are not hostile, but simply cannot
understand the need to exempt religion. But whether
regulation results from hostility, indifference, or ignorance, the
consequence to believers is the same.
All of these problems are aggravated by the reaction t o
Smith in the lower courts, in government bureaus, and among
secular interest groups. Many judges, bureaucrats, and
activists have taken Smith as a signal that the Free Exercise
Clause is largely repealed, and that the needs of*religious
minorities are no longer entitled to any consideration. I briefly
discuss some contemporary examples.
Culturally conservative churches, including Catholics,
conservative Protestants, Orthodox Jews, and Mormons, are
under constant attack on issues related t o abortion,
homosexuality, ordination of women, and moral standards for
sexual behavior. The most aggressive elements of the prochoice, gay rights, and feminist movements are not content t o
prevail in the larger society; they also want to impose their
agenda on dissenting churches. Sometimes they succeed. St.
Agnes Hospital in Baltimore had a residency program in
obstetrics and gynecology, but the program lost its
accreditation because the hospital refused t o perform abortions
or teach doctors how to do them." There has been recurring
litigation, with mixed results, between churches and gay rights

St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990). Riddick was
14.
decided without reference to Smith, on the basis of a seriously diluted version of
the compelling interest test. Under Smith, the law is valid without regard to the
weight of the state's interest. To accomplish its purpose, RFRA must restore the
original understanding of the compelling interest test, as set out in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 US. 398 (1963), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Thomas
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See infra part V. RFRA does not codify
cases such as Riddick, which apply a lower standard and call it compelling
interest.
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organization^.'^ But the opinion in Smith is reasonably clear:
Any well-drafted gay rights ordinance would be a facially
neutral law of general applicability, and the Free Exercise
Clause will not exempt religious organizations. These recurring
conflicts over sexual morality are the most obvious examples of
interest group attacks on religious liberty.
The problem of bureaucratic inflexibility is illustrated by
one of the saddest cases since Smith, a case involving a n
unauthorized autopsy. Several minority religions in America
have strong teachings against mutilation of the human body,
and they view autopsies as a form of mutilation. Faith groups
with such teachings include many Jews, Navajo Indians, and
the Hmong, an immigrant population from Laos. The Hmong
believe that if a n autopsy is performed, the spirit of the
deceased will never be free.
I n Yang u. Sturner,16 a distressed district judge held that
Smith left him powerless to do anything about a n unnecessary
autopsy performed on a young Hmong man. The judge
movingly described the deep grief of the victim's family, the
obvious emotional pain of the many Hmongs who came to
witness the trial, and his own deep regret at being forced to
uphold a profound violation of their religious liberty. He
describes a n autopsy done largely out of medical curiosity, with
no suspicion of foul play, with no authorization in Rhode Island
law, and without the slightest regard for the family's religious
beliefs." But under Smith, the state does not need a good
reason, or even any reason at all. There is simply no
substantive constitutional right to religious liberty after Smith.
An example of old-fashioned religious prejudice is Munn u.
Algee,18 a suit for the wrongful death of Elaine Munn. Mrs.
Munn was killed in a n automobile accident in which the other
driver admitted fault. I n accord with her Jehovah's Witness
faith, Mrs. Munn refused a blood transfusion; the doctors
disagreed sharply over whether a transfusion would have done
any good. The defendant driver's insurance company
15. See Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980); Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987); Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472
N.W.2d 355 (Mim. Ct. App. 1991).
750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
16.
Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845, 846-47, 853-57 (D.R.I.), withdrawn, 750
17.
F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991).
18.
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successfidly argued that Mrs. Munn was responsible for her
own death, because she refused the blood transfusion. Citing
Smith, the court of appeals held that she had no right to refuse
a blood transfusion.19
Even worse, the insurance company was permitted to
attack a wide range of other Jehovah's Witness teachings as
unpatriotic, narrow-minded, or strange. The insurance company
forced Mr. Munn to testify about the Jehovah's Witness belief
that Christ returned to earth in 1914, their belief that the
world will end at Armageddon and that only Jehovah's
Witnesses will be spared destruction, their belief that there is
no hell, and their conscientious refusal to serve in the military
or salute the flag. This case was tried t o a mostly white
Mississippi jury at the height of the political controversy over
flag burning. The Munn family is black, and the insurance
company successfully excluded all but one of the black jurors.
The jury awarded no damages for Mrs. Munn's death, and only
token damages for Mr. Munn's injuries and for Mrs. Munn's
pain and suffering prior to death.
Astonishingly, the court of appeals upheld the jury's
verdict. One judge thought the attack on Jehovah's Witness
teachings was relevant and entirely proper.20A second judge
thought these attacks were so obviously irrelevant that they
could not have affected the jury's deliberation^.^' For these
wholly inconsistent reasons, the Munns were left with only
token compensation. This trial was surely unconstitutional
even after Smith, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The
case illustrates the symbolic consequences of Smith: there is a
widespread impression that religious minorities simply have no
constitutional rights anymore.
Yang and Munn illustrate another important point. The
Munns were black; the Yangs were Hmong. Racial and ethnic
minorities are often also religious minorities. The civil rights
laws are to little avail unless they provide for religious liberty
as well as for racial and ethnic justice.
Not even mainstream churches can count on sympathetic
regulation. Cornerstone Bible Church in Hastings, Minnesota
was zoned out of town and left without a place t o worship.
Applying Smith, the district court upheld the exclusionary
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 574.
Id. at 579 (Barksdale, J., concurring).
Id. at 572 n.6 (opinion of Smith, J.).
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zoning, equating the zoning rights of churches with the zoning
rights of pornographic movie theaterd2 The court of appeals
held that Cornerstone is entitled to a new trial, but its opinion
did not solve either Cornerstone's problem or the zoning
problems of other churches. The court of appeals held that
cities need have only a rational basis for excluding churches
from town. In spite of clear evidence of discrimination against
churches, the court refused to apply the compelling interest
test.23
Cornerstone's problem with hostile zoning is not unique.
Restrictive zoning laws are often enforced with indifference to
religious needs-and sometimes with outright hostility to the
presence of churches. Zoning laws have been invoked to
prevent new activities in existing churches and synagogues, t o
limit the architecture of churches and synagogues, to exclude
minority faiths such as Islam and Buddhism, and to prevent
churches and synagogues from being built at all in new
Most major American religions teach
suburban cornm~nities.~~
some duty to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and shelter the
homeless; but when a church or synagogue tries to act on such
teachings, it is likely to get a complaint from the neighbors and
a citation from the zoning board. In the zoning cases, the
problem is not that the church has a doctrinal tenet or moral
teaching that directly conflicts with the policy of the law.
Rather, the problem is simply that the law restricts the
church's ability to carry out its mission. Religious exercise is
not free when churches cannot locate in new communities, or
when existing churches cannot define their own mission. The
free exercise of religion under RFRA must include the churches'
definition and pursuit of their own religious missions and
management of their own internal affairs.

The Supreme Court has held that legislatures may exempt
religious exercise from formally neutral laws.25But individual
22.
Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D.
Minn. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
23.
Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 11.13 (8th
Cir. 1991).
24.
For accounts of these cases, see R. Gustav Niebuhr, Here Is the Church; As
for the People, They're Picketing It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at Al.
25.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).
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exemptions, obtained one statute at a time, are not a workable
means of protecting religious liberty. In each request for a
legislative exemption, churches are likely t o find an aroused
interest group on the other side, and they will be trying to
amend that interest group's statute. Such battles can be
endless. The fight over student gay rights groups at
Georgetown University resulted in ten published judicial orders
and two acts of C o n g r e s ~ . ~ ~
Churches have t o win these battles over and over, at every
level of government. They have to avoid being regulated by the
Congress, by the state legislatures, by the county commissions,
by the city councils, and by the administrative agencies at each
of these levels. Churches have to avoid being regulated this
year and next year and every year after that. If they lose even
once in any forum, they have lost the war; their religious
practice is subject t o regulatory interference. This is not a
workable means of protecting religious liberty.
It is important to understand that every religion is at risk.
Every church offends some interest group, and many churches
offend numerous interest groups. No church is big enough or
tough enough to fight them all off, over and over, at every level
of government. The situation is even more hopeless for
individual believers with special needs not shared by their
whole denomination. Consider the case of Frances Quaring, a
Pentecostal Christian who studied the Bible on her own and
understood the commandment against graven images with
unusual stri~tness.~'Mrs. Quaring would not allow a
photograph in her house. She would not allow a television in
her house. She removed the labels from her groceries or
obliterated the pictures with black markers. For Mrs. Quaring,
it was plainly forbidden t o carry a photograph on her driver's
license, and when the legislature required photographs, she
could not get a driver's license.28
It would be nearly impossible for any legislature to know
in advance about a believer like Mrs. Quaring and to enact an
exemption for her. The Mrs. Quarings of the world cannot hire
lobbyists to monitor the legislature and protect their religious

26.
The judicial and legislative history is summarized in Clarke v. United
States, 915 F.2d 699, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
27.
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), a f f d by equally divided
Court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 US. 478 (1985).
28.
Id. at 1122-23.
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liberty from any bill that might interfere with their littleknown beliefs. The only way to provide for such unforeseeable
religious claims is with a general provision guaranteeing free
exercise of religion. The Free Exercise Clause was once such a
provision, but Smith says that it is not such a provision
anynore. RFRA would restore such a provision to the United
States Code.
RFRA would solve the problem of perpetual religious
conflict with interest groups and also the problem of religious
minorities too small to be heard in the legislature. I t would do
so by creating a n across-the-board right to argue for religious
exemptions and make the government carry the burden of proof
when it claims that it cannot afford to grant exemptions. RFRA
has a chance to work because it is as universal as the Free
Exercise Clause. It treats every religious faith and every
government interest equally, granting neither special favors
nor exceptions for any group. RFRA is America's only nearterm hope to rise above the paralysis of interest group politics
and restore protection for religious liberty.
Religious liberty is popular in principle, but in specific
applications it quickly becomes entangled in other issues.
Government bureaucrats would never admit that they are
against religious liberty, but nearly all of them think their own
program is so important that no religious exception can be
tolerated. Few interest groups admit that they are against
religious liberty, but almost every interest group thinks its own
agenda is so important that no religious exception can be
tolerated. The religious community itself is divided on many
issues raised by secular interest groups, and denominations
sometimes find it hard to speak out when a bill pits their
commitment to religious liberty against their commitment to
some other principle. RFRA's across-the-board feature attempts
to cut through all of this special pleading.
In most of these conflicts between religious liberty and
secular interest groups, an exemption for religious liberty does
little or no damage to any legitimate secular goals. The interest
group that succeeds i n enacting a bill would get its way in 95%
or 98% or 99.9% of the cases; the religious exemption merely
creates a small enclave of conscience for religious dissenters.
But to get those exemptions statute by statute requires
political and legislative battles that can be both enormously
divisive and very expensive. Congress is the greatest expert on
the legislative process; it knows the practical realities of
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interest group politics. Congress can find as a fact that specific
exemptions enacted one statute a t a time are not a workable
means of protecting the free exercise of religion.

RFRA would permit religious liberty to be burdened only
when that burden is the least restrictive means to serve a
compelling governmental interest. The compelling interest test
takes meaning from the Supreme Court's earlier cases, and
especially from the congressional finding that "the compelling
interest as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing governmental interests.'"
This statement of purpose is important to the bill.
Even before Smith, the Court had been criticized for
excessive deference to governmental agencies in free exercise
cases. But most of these deferential decisions were not decided
under the compelling interest test at all, either because the
Court found no burden on religious exerciseS0 or because it
created exceptions to the compelling interest test.31 These
cases cast no light on the meaning of the compelling interest
test.
Sherbert and Yoder, the two cases expressly mentioned in
the bill, were part of a series of free exercise cases that
rigorously enforced the compelling interest test. Most
legitimate governmental interests a r e not compelling.
"Compelling" does not mean merely a "reasonable means of
promoting a legitimate public interest."32 Nor does it mean
merely important.33 Rather, "compelling interests" include
only those few interests "of the highest order,"34 or i n a
similar formulation, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
29.
H.R. 1308, supra note 1, $ 2(a)(5); see also S. 578, supra note 1, $ 2(b)(1)
(stating that one purpose of the Act is "to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder" (citations omitted)).
30.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53
(1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986).
31.
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987) (prisons);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (military).
32.
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
(rejecting a test proposed in the plurality opinion in Bowen, 476 U.S. a t 708
(Burger, C.J.)).
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981).
33.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
34.
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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paramount interest^."^^ The Supreme Court explains
"compelling" with superlatives like "paramount ," "gravest," and
"highest." Even these interests are sufficient only if they are
"not otherwise served,"36 if "no alternative forms of regulation
would combat such abuses,"37 if the challenged law is "the
least restrictive means of achieving" the compelling interest:'
and if the government pursues its alleged interest uniformly
across the full range of similar conduct.3g Even Smith
cautions against diluting the test: "[Ilf 'compelling interest7
really means what it says (and watering it down here would
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many
laws will not meet the test."40
The stringency of the compelling interest test appears most
clearly in Wisconsin u. Yoder, which invalidated Wisconsin's
compulsory education laws as applied to Amish children.41
The education of children is important, and the first two years
of high school are basic to that interest, but the State's interest
in the first two years of high school was not sufficiently
compelling to justify a serious burden on free exercise.42
The unemployment compensation cases also illustrate the
point. The government's interest in saving money is legitimate,
but it is not sufficiently compelling to justify refusing
compensation to those whose religious faith disqualifies them
from employ~nent.~~
Moreover, it is not enough for government to point to
unconfirmed risks or fears. Defending its compulsory education
law in Yoder, Wisconsin relied on the plausible fear that some
Amish children would "choose to leave the Amish community7'
and that they would "be ill-equipped for life.'"4 The Court
rejected that fear as "highly speculative," demanding "specific
evidence" that Amish adherents were leaving and that they

35.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
36.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
37.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. a t 407.
38.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
39.
Simon & Schuster, h c . v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501, 509-11 (1991); Florida Star v. B.J.F.,491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989).
40.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
41.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-29.
Id.
42.
43. . Sherbert, 374 U.S. a t 406-09 (Seventh-Day Adventist discharged by her
employer because she would not work on Saturday).
44.
Yoder, 406 US. at 224.
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were "doomed to become burdens on society."45 Similarly,
various states have feared that a combination of false claims
and honest adoption of religious objections to work would dilute
unemployment compensation funds, hinder the scheduling of
weekend work, increase unemployment, and encourage
employers to make intrusive inquiries into the religious beliefs
of job applicants. Some of these fears were plausible; some
were not. But the Supreme Court rejected them all for lack of
evidence that they were really happening?
The lesson of the Court's cases is that government must
show some interest more compelling than saving money or
educating Amish children. Such is the compelling interest test
of Sherbert and Yoder, and thus of RFRA. The Supreme Court
has found a compelling interest in only three free exercise
cases. In each of these cases, strong reasons of self-interest or
prejudice threatened unmanageable numbers of false claims to
exemption, and the laws a t issue were essential to national
survival or to express constitutional norms: national defenseP7
collection of revenuep8 and racial equality in education:'
The stringency of the compelling interest test makes sense
in light of its origins; it is a judicially implied exception to the
constitutional text.50 The Constitution does not say that
government may prohibit free exercise for compelling reasons.
Rather, the Constitution says absolutely that there shall be "no
law" prohibiting free exercise of religi~n.~'The implied
exception is based on necessity, and its rationale runs no
further than cases of clear necessity. RFRA makes the
exception explicit rather than implicit, but the stringent
standard for satisfying the exception should not change.
OBJECTIONS
VI. THEABORTION,TAX,AND FUNDING
The principal opposition to RFRA has centered on a
demand for provisos stating that the bill would create no cause

45.
Id. at 224-25.
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989);
46.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
47.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
48.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
49.
50. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of
Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALEL.J. 1711, 174445 (1990) (book review).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of action to challenge laws restricting abortion, no cause of
action to challenge the use or disposition of public funds or
property, and no cause of action to challenge the tax status of
any other person.52These proposed amendments injected into
the RFRA debate highly divisive and mostly irrelevant
controversies over abortion, public funding of religious
institutions, and tax exemptions for religious institutions. The
bill failed to move for nearly three years because of deadlock
over these proposed amendments. If those demanding these
amendments had deliberately set out to prevent RFRA's
enactment, they could not have chosen a better way t o succeed.
The deadlock was apparently resolved in March, 1993. The
bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress with a new
proviso, stating that tax exemptions and public funding do not
violate RFRA unless they also violate the Establishment
Clause." This amendment would recognize that these issues
have always been resolved under other law that directly
addresses these very questions, and that the other, more
relevant law should continue to control. There is also tentative
agreement to state in the legislative history that RFRA does
not expand any right to religiously motivated abortions that
may have existed prior to Smith. In return for these provisions,
the United States Catholic Conference, by far the largest and
most influential group previously opposed, has now endorsed
the b W 4
In addition, President Clinton has endorsed the bill.55The
abortion controversy had kept President Bush neutral, caught
between that part of his pro-life constituency that opposed the
bill on abortion grounds and that part of his pro-life and
evangelical constituency that strongly supported the bill. The
bill has long been supported by such staunchly pro-life groups
as the National Association of Evangelicals, the Christian Life
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Home School Legal
Defense Fund.56 But so long as the bill had strong pro-life
52.

These provisos were included in a competing bill in the 102d Congress. See

H.R.4040 8 3(cX2), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
53.
H.R. 1308, supra note 1, 8 7; S. 578, supra note 1, 8 7.
54.
Letter from Frank J. Monahan, Director, Office of Government Liaison,
United States Catholic Conference, to Senator Edward K e ~ e d y(March 9, 1993)
(on file with the B.Y.U.Law Review).
55.
Letter from President William Clinton to Senator Edward Kennedy (March
11, 1993) (on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review).
See, e.g., The Religous Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before
56.
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opposition, there was a risk of a Bush veto. With the veto
threat removed and with powerful new endorsements from
President Clinton and the U.S. Catholic Conference, the bill
should move. It may even be law by the time this article is
published; it passed the House unanimously on May 11,
1993:~ and was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee
by a vote of fifteen to one.58 But if the compromise falls
through, any amendments on abortion, tax exemptions, or
public funding should be rejected.
The principle of RFRA is that it enacts a statutory version
of the Free Exercise Clause. Like the Free Exercise Clause
itself, RFRA is universal in its scope. RFRA singles out no
claims for special advantage or disadvantage. I t favors no
religious claim over any other and no state interests over any
other. RFRA simply enacts a universal standard: Burdens on
religious exercise must be justified by compelling interests.
Limiting the bill to enactment of the compelling
governmental interest standard without the proposed
amendments is a principled solution to the practical problem of
disagreement over particular claims. If RFRA tries to resolve
every possible conflict between a religious claim and a
governmental interest, we will be caught up in the same
morass of endless political conflict that we now face without
RFRA. A bill limited to a statement of universal principle is
neutral on all possible claims, including claims about abortion,
tax exemption, and public hnding. It would return all religious
claims to their pre-Smith position under the Free Exercise
Clause, allowing each side to argue as they would have argued
under Sherbert and Yoder.
The proposed amendments would take a very different
approach, codifying Smith insofar as it cut off the last shred of
argument for certain claims that supporters of the amendments
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (Restoring Religious
Liberty in America: An Analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration A d by
Coalitions for America) (full text on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1992) ChereinaRer House Hearings] (statement of Robert Dugan, Jr.,
Director, Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals); id. at 23
(statement of Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints).
139 CONG.REC. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993).
57.
139 CONG. REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress
58.
May 10, 1993, a t A9.
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y.TIMES,
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do not like. The amendments would provide that most religious
claims are restored to where they would have been under the
Free Exercise Clause, but that these three sets of claims are
left subject to Smith. Whatever the merits of these
amendments, they cannot be defended on the ground that they
are neutral toward the three excluded sets of claims.
These three amendments are enormously divisive, but the
divisions are almost entirely symbolic. Each of the three
amendments relates t o an issue that has always been litigated
and decided under some other clause of the Constitution. The
right to abortion has been principally litigated under the Due
Process Clause, and most challenges to church tax exemption
and to public funding for churches have been brought under
the Establishment Clause. In each case, free exercise theories
have been around for a long time, but the Supreme Court has
rejected them.
As the Court became more and more conservative,
challenges to abortion laws, church tax exemptions, and public
funding for religious agencies received an increasingly hostile
reception under any clause. As the litigants who brought these
challenges became increasingly desperate, they experimented
with alternative legal theories-and were unwilling to give up
on any theory, however tenuous. Then, to everyone's great
surprise, pro-choice forces won a dramatic victory in Planned
Parenthood u. C~sey.~'
But win or lose, the reality is that
changing the legal theory in their pleadings is not going t o
make the Court any more or less receptive to their claims.
With o r without Smith, putting a free exercise label on a
warmed-over abortion or Establishment Clause claim is quite
unlikely to make any difference.
The tax exemption issues have been largely resolved by
cases already decided. The public funding issues will continue
to be litigated under the Establishment Clause with o r without
RFRA; and abortion rights are being defined in continuing due
process litigation and in legislative debate over the pending
Freedom of Choice Act. If the Court overrules Casey and Roe v.
Wade:'
i t will be because of a fundamental jurisprudential
judgment that the abortion issue is not appropriately resolved
by judges-that "the answers to most of the cruel questions
posed are political and not juridical."' It is extraordinarily
59.
60.
61.

112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
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unlikely that the Court's judgment on that question would be
affected by RFRA.
A. Abortion
Parts of the pro-choice movement have persistently asserted that restrictions on abortion violate the religion clauses of
the First Amendment. I t would follow fkom that argument that
religiously motivated abortions are also protected by RFRA.
But a claim to abortion rights under RFRA would matter only
if other legal protections for abortion were eliminated. Casey
and the election of a pro-choice President have dramatically
changed predictions about the future of abortion law, but the
issue for RFRA has not changed. Questions about the right to
abortion will be decided on their own terms, and not under
RFRA.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey is an emphatic reaffirmation
of the basic right to abortion. For the foreseeable future, there
is a constitutional right to abortion and nothing in RFRA will
affect that. If pro-life legislators kill RFRA, they will be compounding their defeat on abortion with a terrible defeat for
religious liberty. Even from a single-issue pro-life perspective,
RFRA is now more necessary than before, to protect pro-life
hospitals and medical personnel from being forced to participate in abortion^.^'
The bitterly divided opinions in Casey make the long-term
future of abortion law dependent on legislation or future appointments to the Court. The Casey dissenters will probably
adhere to their dissent, and perhaps some future Justice will
provide the fifth vote to overrule Casey as well as Roe. But one
of the four dissenters has announced his retirement,63 so it
now seems more likely that they will never get a fifth vote, and
that the constitutional right to abortion will be a permanent
part of our law. Either way, RFRA can add nothing to the right
to abortion.
The groups demanding a n abortion amendment to RFRA
are worried about a most unlikely sequence of events: they fear
that the Court might overrule Casey and Roe, and then reconcurring).
62. See St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990); supra note
14 and accompanying text.
63.
Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step Down from High Court, N.Y.
TIMES,Mar 20, 1993, at 1.
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create abortion rights as a matter of free exercise under RFRA.
These fears are groundless for several reasons.
First, religion clause objections to restrictions on abortion
are not new; they were presented to the Supreme Court in
Harris u. McRae." There, the Court rejected the claim that
abortion laws that coincide with religious teachings violate the
Establishment Clause.65 It also held that no plaintiff in that
case had standing to assert a free exercise claim because no
plaintiff alleged that her religious beliefs compelled or motivated her desire for a n abortion? The Court also held that a free
exercise claim to abortion would depend on the religious beliefs
of individual women, and that such a claim could not be asserted by an organi~ation.~'
In the thirteen years since Harris, there has been no judicial movement toward a free exercise right to publicly funded
abortions. If free exercise were a viable route for evading decisions upholding restrictions on abortion, someone should have
come forward with plaintiffs who could satisfy the standing
requirements laid down in Harris. Even though Harris does not
formally resolve the free exercise issue, it has effectively resolved the larger issue: the Court does not recognize any constitutional right to public funding for abortions. A decision overruling Casey and Roe would be equally effective in resolving
the larger issue of any right to abortion.
The standing rule in Harris is also a major victory for prolife forces and a serious obstacle to pro-choice forces. The rule
that organizations lack standing to bring free exercise claims
would logically apply to RFRA claims, and it would preclude
broad-based RFRA challenges to abortion laws. Any RFRA
challenge would have to proceed one woman a t a time, with
judicial examination of her individual beliefs.
Second, a decision overruling Casey and Roe would almost
certainly preclude a right to abortion under the Free Exercise
Clause or RFRA. If Casey and Roe are overruled, the reason
will be the government's interest in protecting unborn life. If
the state's interest in protecting unborn life overrides reproductive liberty under the Due Process Clause, that interest will be
equally compelling under RFRA. Thus, even if the Court were

64.

65.
66.
67.

448 U.S. 297, 318-21 (1980).
Id. at 319-20.

Id. at 320-21.
Id.
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to hold that abortion can sometimes be religious exercise, the
states' compelling interest in unborn life would override that
right.
It would make no difference if the Court said that the
Constitution simply does not protect the right to choose abortion, thus distinguishing abortion from other constitutionally
protected choices about family, reproduction, or bodily integrity.
The basis for such a distinction could not be that abortion has
nothing to do with reproduction or bodily integrity; rather, the
only plausible reason for distinction is that the state's interest
in unborn life changes the balance of competing interests. The
four dissenters in Casey were explicit about this: "Unlike marriage, procreation and contraception, abortion 'involves the
purposeful termination of potential life.' The abortion decision
must therefore 'be recognized as sui generis, different in kind
from the others that the Court has protected under the rubric
of personal or family privacy and autonomy.' ""
It has been suggested that the Court might read RFRA as
codifying the rule that the interest in unborn life is not compelling, on the ground that this was the law at the time Congress
acted. This outcome is implausible as well. The bill takes no
position on whether any particular government interest is compelling. This silence is appropriate; Congress should not attempt t o resolve particular controversies in a bill about religious exercise generally.
The latest version of the abortion argument against RFRA
is that it might be used t o evade the restrictions on abortion
upheld in Casey. Like all the earlier versions, this argument
depends on the fear that the Court will twice reverse its position on abortion, upholding new restrictions in Casey and then
reversing that position on the basis of a statute that never
mentions abortion. The argument further assumes that the
Court will complete this double reversal even though its opinion in Casey gave extraordinary weight to stare decisis in the
abortion context.69
Such a double reversal is not a plausible outcome unless
the statute clearly speaks to abortion and unambiguously directs the Court to reverse its position. RFRA does not do that;

68. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined .by White,
Scalia & Thomas, JJ.) (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69.
Id. at 2814-16 (majority opinion) (fearing that any overruling on such a
controversial issue would be perceived as caving in to political pressure).

240

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993

it does not mention abortion, and its general language leaves
the Court many escape routes. In Harris u. McRae, the Court
was skeptical that many abortions are religiously motivated,
and it can only be far more skeptical that many women have
religious objections to twenty-four hour waiting periods or informed consent rules.
If such rules are attacked not for their own religious signif'icance, but because they burden the right to a religiously motivated abortion, the Court is likely to hold that the compelling
interest test is not triggered unless the burden on religion is
substantial or undue. The plurality in Casey did not create its
undue burden test out of thin air; rather it said that the right
to abortion had been an unjustified exception to the general
rule that only significant burdens on rights require justification. "As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps
abortion has recognized, not every law which makes a right
more difficult to exercise is, @sofacto, an infringement of that
right.'770The Court is quite likely to read this general principal into RFRA, especially given Jimmy Swaggart Ministries u.
Board of Equalization, where the Court assumed that burdens
on religion are of no constitutional signIiicance unless they
require the church or the believer to violate a particular doctrinal tenet." The states' argument would be that waiting periods, informed consent requirements, and the like do not violate religious tenets and do not unduly burden any right t o
abortion, religiously motivated or otherwise. This is not the
best interpretation of the statute-Swaggart's emphasis on
violation of specific doctrinal tenets permits gross violations of
religious libertyy2-but this is a possible interpretation generally, and almost certainly the Court's interpretation in the
abortion context. If the Court thinks that waiting periods, consent requirements, and the like are only minor burdens on
abortion under the Constitution, there is no reason for it t o
suddenly think they are undue burdens under RFRA.
There is a better way to reach the same result. The Court
should not say that minor burdens on constitutional rights
require no justification. Rather, it should say that minor bur-

70.
Id. at 2818 (plurality opinion).
71.
493 US. 378, 391-92 (1990).
72.
See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP.CT. REV.1,
23-28; see also the discussion of zoning cases supra notes 22-24 and accompanying
text.
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dens require justification proportionate to the burden-that the
state's interest must compellingly outweigh the burden on the
constitutional right. If the restrictions upheld in Casey are
minor and easily justified burdens on abortion in general, they
are equally minor and easily justified burdens on religiously
motivated abortions. An implicit example of this sort of
compelling-interest-balancing analysis appears in Burson v.
Freeman, where a relatively modest restriction on political
speech was upheld on the basis that a relatively modest state
interest was ~ o m p e l l i n g . ~ ~
It is only common sense to recognize that a minor burden
on a right may be justified by a less compelling interest than a
total prohibition of the same right. Recognizing this point eliminates the need to draw arbitrary lines between major and
minor burdens, or between central and peripheral religious
practices, and it eliminates the need for Swaggart's complete
denial of protection to non-mandatory aspects of religious observance. Requiring that the government's interest compellingly outweigh the burden on the protected right is the best interpretation of RFRA, and it would be the best interpretation of
the compelling interest test in constitutional law generally.
All doctrinal variations on the argument over abortion are
subject to the overriding fact that Congress is explicitly considering abortion in another bill. If Congress codifies anything
about abortion, it will be in the Freedom of Choice Act.74The
Court knows N 1 well that Congress is as divided over abortion
as the American people. It would be absurd to read a statute
that never mentions abortion as somehow codifying the law of
abortion, and more so when Congress i n the same session votes
on a n express codification of the law of abortion. What is more,
RFRA has both pro-life and pro-choice sponsors, making the
argument even more absurd. A bill supported by a broad range
of pro-life groups cannot sensibly be read as creating a right to
abortion.
If I were a pro-life legislator, I would turn out the largest
possible pro-life vote for RFRA, and the largest possible pro-life
vote against the Freedom of Choice Act, thereby unambiguously making the record clear that the two bills are very

73. 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851-58 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding ban-on political solicitation within one hundred feet of polling place, to prevent fraud and intimidation of voters).
74.
H.R. 25, H.R.1068, & S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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different-that one takes a position on abortion and the other
does not. And in working to turn out the pro-life vote on RFRA,
I would emphasize one simple point: St. Agnes Hospital is a
real case.75A Catholic hospital has been forced to choose between teaching and performing abortions or abandoning obstetrics. By contrast, successful abortion claims under RFRA are
imaginary-a theoretical possibility that depends on an extraordinarily unlikely combination of circumstances.
Pro-life legislators must also understand that not all resistance to an abortion amendment comes from the pro-choice
side. Agudath Israel, the Orthodox Jewish group that has been
a n active part of the pro-life movement, insists that Jewish
teaching mandates abortion in certain narrowly defined and
exceptional cases.76Any state prohibitions of abortion likely to
be enacted will have exceptions for the cases that matter to
Agudath Israel; its members do not expect to rely on RFRA.
But neither can they accept their Christian coalition partners'
dismissal of their sincere religious teachings as officially unworthy of respect. Their loyal support for the pro-life movement, over the objection of most other Jewish organizations,
entitles them to consideration in return from pro-life legislators.
Even though there is little merit to claims of a free exercise right to abortion, there are pro-choice groups supporting
the bill. They cannot be forced to accept language precluding
their arguments, any more than pro-life groups can be forced to
accept language precluding pro-life arguments. The way for the
bill to be abortion-neutral is not to mention abortion a t all. The
legislative history should simply say (1) that the pro-life side
can make its arguments that no abortions are religiously motivated and that in a world without Casey, Roe, or the Freedom
of Choice Act, protecting unborn life is obviously a compelling
interest; (2) that the pro-choice side can make its arguments
that at least some abortions are religiously motivated and that
protection of fetuses is not a compelling interest; and (3) that
Congress has merely enacted the standard for decision and has
not codified either set of answers.
In a world with Casey, Roe, or the Freedom of Choice Act,

75.
St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990); see supra note
14 and accompanying text.
76.
See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 56, at 411, 416-17 (memorandum of
Agudath Israel of America (May 14, 1992)).

2211

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

243

those arguments are irrelevant. In a world without Casey, Roe,
or the Freedom of Choice Act, the pro-life side will win those
arguments. But neither side should be able to say that Congress codified its position. The bill as drafted is abortionneutral, and unless there is a compromise with broad support,
Congress should keep the bill as it was originally introduced.

B. Tax Exemption
The law regarding tax exemption is relatively settled. Religious organizations cannot be given tax exemptions exclusively
for religion, but they can be included in broader tax-exempt
categories such as the religious, charitable, scientific, and educational organizations mentioned in the Internal Revenue
Code?
With respect to any particular organization's eligibility for
a tax exemption, a safe generalization from the cases is that no
plaintiff has standing to litigate the tax liability of another
taxpayer? Cases challenging tax exemptions of churches,
schools, and hospitals have had multiple plaintiffs with resourceful lawyers; if none of them could find a plaintiff with
standing, it probably cannot be done. The Second Circuit's
opinion in In re United States Catholic Conference holds out the
possibility of an exception someday,79but that theoretical possibility would not be a free exercise exception and it is not relevant to RFRA. The Catholic Conference litigation imposed an
enormous burden on the Catholic Church; I joined with other
lawyers in filing an amicus brief supporting the Church, and I
fully support the Church's desire never to repeat that experience. But the fact is that the Church won, and there is no need
t o re-fight that war. The opinions that so burdened the Church
in that litigation relied on the Establishment Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause; no court at any stage of that litigation
relied on the Free Exercise Clause. RFRA would not be a basis

77.
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 US. 1 (1989); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
78.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-66 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-46 (1976); In re United States Catholic Conference,
885 F.2d 1020, 1024-31 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
79.
In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031; see also Simon,
426 U.S. at 36-37 (in the first of this series of cases, reserving the question whether to announce an absolute rule that only the taxpayer and the government could
have standing).
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for litigation over tax exemptions.
C. Public Funding
Challenges to public funding of religious institutions have
always been litigated under the Establishment Clause. The
Establishment Clause directly addresses the funding issue, and
the Court has created a special standing rule for Establishment
Clause claims to facilitate that litigation?' An occasional litigant has asserted in the alternative that such expenditures
also violate the Free Exercise Clause, but the Supreme Court
has twice summarily rejected those claims.s1 The Court considered an analogous claim a t greater length in United States
v. Lee, and held unanimously that the Free Exercise Clause
gives taxpayers no right "to challenge the tax system because
tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief," and that "religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax."82This
conclusion was based on the compelling interest test, the same
defense that is written into RFRA.
The argument for a public funding amendment is, therefore, even more bizarre than the argument for an abortion
amendment. The Court has repeatedly limited public funding
to religious bodies under the Establishment Clause; it has
squarely rejected free exercise complaints about the expenditure of tax funds to support religion or any other program to
which a taxpayer has religious objections. The fear was that
the Court will change its mind--on both issues-in opposite
directions. Perhaps the Court will overrule its Establishment
Clause cases and permit more public funding for religious bodies, and also overrule its Free Exercise Clause cases and say
that RFRA forbids the public fiulding that the Court just permitted under the Establishment Clause. It is hard to imagine a
less plausible pair of doctrinal developments.
D. The Establishment Clause Proviso
The bill's erstwhile opponents also objected to R F W s
section seven, which provides that nothing in the bill "shall be

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-06 (1968).
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (plurality opinion); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U S . 236, 248-49 (1968).
82.
455 U S . 252, 260 (1982).
80.
81.
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construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address" the Establishment Clause. The reason for this proviso is the same as the
reason for not saying anything about particular free exercise
claims. The supporters of the bill agree on the principle of free
exercise, but disagree on particular applications, and disagree
even about the basic principle of the Establishment Clause.
Those disputed issues are carefully excluded from a bill designed simply to enact the one fundamental principle on which
nearly everyone agrees.
All sides to Establishment Clause disputes can continue to
argue their positions. Those so inclined can continue to argue
that the Establishment Clause is merely a redundant appendage to the Free Exercise Clause. This bill does not reject that
argument any more than it rejects the argument of strict
separationists. RFRA is quite explicit; it says nothing about the
Establishment Clause. The fear that this proviso will codify
current interpretations of the Establishment Clause borders on
the irrational. That is plainly not what section seven says; a
bill cannot codify something that it does not affect, interpret, or
even address.

POWER
VII. CONGRESSIONAL

A. The Reach of Congressional Power
Congress has power to enact RFRA under Section Five of
the Fourteenth A m e n d ~ n e n t .Repeated
majorities of the Su~~
preme Court have upheld analogous exercises of congressional
power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments. Section Five
gives Congress, with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment,
"the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause" with respect to Article I?4 "Whatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view," is within the power of Congress,
unless prohibited by some other provision of the Constitut i ~ n . ~Similar
'
enforcement provisions in Section Two of the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have been given similar
interpretations, and the cases are often cited interchange83. For a more detailed analysis of congressional power to enact RFRA, see
Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights,
Can Congress Save US?An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
141 U.PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993).
84. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
85. Ex par& Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
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ably.86
Power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment also includes
power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause and other provisions
of the Bill of Rights that are applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress has enacted other legislation
to enforce the provisions of the Bill of Rights, most obviously 42
U.S.C. $5 1983 and 1988; these provisions have been used to
enforce the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, as
incorporated through the Fourteenth, in thousands of cases.
The Supreme Court has routinely decided these cases, usually
without even noting the source of congressional power. The
Court did note the source of congressional power in Hutto v.
Finney,'? an Eighth Amendment case in which the Court relied on Congress's Section Five power to override state sovereign immunity.
What may make RFRA seem anomalous at first blush is
that it appears t o attempt to overrule the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith. But RFRA would not overrule the Court;
rather, it would create a statutory right where the Court declined t o create a constitutional right. This distinction is not a
mere formality; it has real consequences that are explored
below. Furthermore, there is nothing unusual about Congress
exercising its Section Five power in this fashion.
The express congressional power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment is independent of the judicial power to
adjudicate cases and controversies arising under it. Congress is
not confined "to the insignificant role of abrogating only those
state laws that the judicial branch was prepared t o adjudge
uncon~titutional.'"~Thus, Congress may sometimes provide
statutory protection for constitutional values that the Supreme
Court is unwilling or unable to protect on its own authority.
The Court agreed unanimously on this point in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.89
This power is clearly illustrated by the various Voting
Rights Acts, in which Congress has forbidden discriminatory
practices that the Supreme Court had been prepared t o toler86.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U S . 448, 477 (1980) (plurality opinion); id.
at 500 (Powell, J., concurring); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U S . 156, 207
n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87.
437 U.S. 678, 693-99 (1978).
88.
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649.
497 U S . 547, 563-66 (1990) (majority opinion); id. at 605-07 (07Connor,J.,
89.
dissenting).
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ate. The Supreme Court has held that literacy tests for voting
' that Condo not violate the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e , ~but
gress may ban literacy tests for voting?' Similarly, the Court
has held that electoral practices with racially discriminatory
, ~ ~that Congress may
effect do not violate the C o n s t i t ~ t i o nbut
forbid such practices pursuant to its Section Five power^?^
Similarly, much of the law of private racial discrimination
depends on Congress's analogous powers under Section Two of
the Thirteenth Amendment. No one would suggest that the
Supreme Court could, on its own authority to adjudicate cases
arising under the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibit all private
discrimination in the making of contracts or in the sale and
ownership of property. There is no case rejecting such a claim
because no one has been bold enough to present it. But Congress has banned all such discrimination pursuant to its power
to enforce the A m e n d m e ~ ~ t . ~ ~
These holdings were not limited-indeed, they were implicitly reaffirmed-by
Patterson u. McLean Credit U n i ~ n ? ~
Patterson unanimously reaffirmed earlier holdings that the
Reconstruction civil rights acts forbid private discrimination,
which necessarily assumes that Congress has power to forbid
private discrimination not forbidden by the Constitution itself.
The controversial holding in Patterson went only to the range
of private conduct covered by the statute; the case cast no
doubt on the constitutional rule that Congress can reach private discrimination pursuant to its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Congress overrode the statutory holding i n
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,'~and this legislation is also
based on the congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction
amendments.
A conservative majority also reaffirmed congressional pow-

Lassiter v. Northampto-n County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-54 (1959).
90.
91.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 131-34, 14447, 216-17, 231-36,
282-84 (1970) (five separate opinions, collectively joined by all nine Justices);
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293-97 (1969); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-58 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 33334 (1966).
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1980).
92.
93.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 172-83 (1980).
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
94.
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 43744 (1968).
95.
491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989).
96.
42 U.S.C. $ 1981(b) (Supp. I1 1991).
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er to go beyond the Court's own interpretations in City of Richmond u. J.A. Croson Co." Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White stated: "[Tlhe power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations which Congress determines threaten
principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal
with those situation^."'^ Justices Kennedy and Scalia recognized the accuracy of the plurality's account,ggbut questioned
its application to racial preferences. As Justice Kennedy put it,
''[Tlhe process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal
protection guarantee when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me.""'
Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens did not reach the Section Five issue.
Most recently, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,"' the
Court relied on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
explain why Congress may, but state and local governments
may not, authorize preferences for racial minorities without a
finding of past di~crimination."~The Court has never said
that the Constitution requires such preferences of its own force.
All nine Justices in Metro Broadcasting recognized Congress's
Section Five powers to go beyond the limits of Supreme Court
decisions; the Justices' only disagreement was over the relevance of that power to a law that applied only t o the work of a
federal agency. The majority relied on Section Five to uphold
racial preferences in the award of broadcast licenses. The four
dissenters thought that Section Five was irrelevant to the case
because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only t o the states.
But they recognized that "Congress has considerable latitude,
presenting special concerns for judicial review, when it exercises its 'unique remedial powers under 5 5.' "Io3

97.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Id. at 490.
98.
99.
Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 518.
101.
497 U S . 547 (1990).
102.
Compare Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563-66 and Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980) (plurality opinion) with Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-91
(plurality opinion) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
103. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 605 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 488 (plurality opinion)).
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B. The Limits of Congressional Power
Only a few opinions suggest limits to the reach of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The most
obvious limit is that Congress may not "restrict, abrogate, or
dilute" the protections of the Bill of Rights in the guise of enforcing them.'" Thus, Congress cannot evade Supreme Court
decisions protecting constitutional rights, although it can supplement Supreme Court decisions refusing t o protect constitutional rights. It is this limitation that fuels Justice Kennedy's
doubts about congressionally mandated racial preferences. If
racial preferences actually violate the Equal Protection Clause,
as he apparently believes, then mandating these violations of
the Clause is not a means of enforcing the clause. Similar concerns appear to underlie the dissenters' insistence in Metro
Broadcasting that Congress may mandate racial preferences
In the dissenters' view,
only to remedy past discriminati~n.'~~
any broader rationale for racial preferences would violate the
Clause rather than enforce it.
Second, congressional power under Section Five is subject
t o other express allocations of power in the Constitution. Thus,
~
of the Court invalidated a
in Oregon v. M i t ~ h e l l 'a~ majority
provision requiring states to extend voting rights t o citizens age
eighteen and over.l0' The Justices in the majority concluded
that the text of the Constitution or the clear intent of the
founders reserved t o the states the power t o determine the
qualifications of their own electors, subject only t o the express
amendments concerning race, sex, and poll taxes.
Third, Congress may not assert its Section Five powers as
a sham to achieve ends unrelated to the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress may not act under Section Five where it does
not believe that a constitutional right is at stake, or perhaps
where no plausible claim could be made that a constitutional
right is at stake. This is the point of the dissenting opinion in
EEOC v. Wyoming,lo8which rejected congressional power t o
104. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
105. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 607-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.)
106. 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970).
107. Id. at 124-31, 154-213, 293-96 (three opinions joined by Burger, C.J., &
Black, Harlan, Stewart & Blackmun, JJ.).
108. 460 U.S. 226, 259-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell,
Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.).
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prohibit mandatory retirement for state employees. The hssent
said: "Congress may act only where a violation lurks. The flaw
in the Commission's analysis is that in this instance, no
one-not the Court, not the Congress-has determined that
mandatory retirement plans violate any rights protected by
The opinion pointed to congressional
these Amend~nents."'~~
enactment and retention of mandatory retirement for several
classifications of federal employees to show that Congress did
not think that mandatory retirement was unconstitutional. But
the dissent recognized that the Court's decisions "allow Congress a degree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth
Amendment safeguard^.""^ The majority upheld the statute
on Commerce Clause grounds and did not speak to the Section
Five issues.
RFRA does not run afoul of these limitations. First, there
is no plausible claim that the Act would violate the Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause or any other right
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith reaffirms
that legislative exemptions to protect religious exercise are
"expected, . . . permitted, or even . . . desirable.""' The Court
unanimously rejected a n Establishment Clause challenge to
legislative exemptions in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos.'l2
Second, RFRA would not interfere with any other express
allocation of power in the Constitution. The Federal Constitution does not recognize or preserve any specific state power to
burden the exercise of religion. The state regulatory powers
that would be affected by the proposed Act are part of the general reserve of state powers, N l y subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Third, RFRA does not assert Fourteenth Amendment power where there is no plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim.
For some members of Congress, this is a critical distinction
between RFRA and the proposed Freedom of Choice Act. If you
believe that the Constitution properly interpreted protects a
woman's right to choose abortion, then both RFRA and the
Freedom of Choice Act are within congressional power under
Section Five. But if you believe that the Constitution properly

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 260 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 262.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (citations omitted).
483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).
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interpreted simply says nothing about abortion, or that the
Constitution protects the unborn child's right to life, then you
believe that there is no Fourteenth Amendment violation lurking for Congress to address in the Freedom of Choice Act. Thus,
pro-life legislators can with complete intellectual consistency
support RFRA and oppose the Freedom of Choice Act on constitutional grounds.
There is, however, a constitutional violation to be remedied
by RFRA. RFRA would enforce the constitutional rule against
laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Congress can act
on the premise that the exercise of religion includes religiously
motivated conduct. Even the Supreme Court recognizes that
much. The Court interprets the Constitution of its own force to
protect religiously motivated acts from regulation that discriminates against religion and from regulation motivated by hostility to religion in general or to a particular religion. "[Tlhe 'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession but
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts."l13
From the perspective of believers whose religious exercise
has been prohibited, it makes little difference whether the
prohibition is found in a discriminatory law or i n a neutral law
of general applicability. Either way, they must abandon their
faith or risk imprisonment and persecution. Either way, it is
undeniably true that their religious exercise has been prohibited. RFRA would protect the right to free exercise against inadvertent, insensitive, and incidental prohibitions as well as
against discriminatory and hostile prohibitions.
Thus RFRA parallels important provisions of the Voting
Rights Acts, also enacted under Section Five. The Supreme
Court construed the constitutional protection for minority voting rights to require proof of overt discrimination or racial
motive on the part of government officials. Congress dispensed
with the requirements of overt discrimination or motive, and
required state and local governments to justify laws that burden minority voting rights. Similarly here, the Court requires
proof of overt discrimination or anti-religious motive to make
out a free exercise violation; RFRA would dispense with those
requirements and require government to justify any burden on
religious practice. RFRA is within the scope of congressional
power for the same reasons that the Voting Rights Acts are

113.

Smith, 494 U.S.at 877.

252

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSI'IY LAW REVIEW [I993

within the scope of congressional power.
Congress can find as a fact that judicial review of legislative motive is an insufficient protection against religious persecution by means of formally neutral laws. Legislative motive is
often unknowable. Legislatures may be wholly indifferent to
the needs of a minority faith, and yet not reveal overt legislative hostility. When a religious minority opposes a bill, or seeks
a n exemption on the ground that a bill requires immoral conduct, it is hard to distinguish religious hostility fiom political
conflict. Even when there is clear religious hostility, courts are
reluctant to impute bad motives to legislators. Religious minorities are no safer than racial minorities if their rights depend
on persuading a federal judge to condemn the government's
motives.
In the Voting Rights Acts, Congress found that facially
neutral laws could be used to deprive minorities of the right to
vote or to dilute their vote, and that legislative motives were
easily hidden so that proof of discriminatory motive was not a
workable means of protecting minority voting rights. Similarly,
Congress can find that facially neutral laws are readily used to
suppress religious practice, that at times such laws have been
instruments of active religious persecution, that proof of antireligious motive is not a workable means of protecting religious
liberty, and that legislating individual exemptions in every
statute and a t every level of government is not a workable
means of protecting religious liberty.

C. The Complementary Roles of the Separate Branches
The Supreme Court's reason for not requiring government
to justify all burdens on religious practice is institutional. The
opinion in Smith is quite clear that the Court does not want
final responsibility for applying the compelling interest test to
religious conduct. The majority does not want a system "in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs."ll4 To say that an exemption for religious exercise "is permitted, or even that it is
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and
that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned
by the court^.""^

114.
115.

Id. at 890 (emphasis added); see also id. at 889 n.5.
Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
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These institutional concerns do not apply to RFRA. Congress, rather than the Court, will make the decision that religious exercise should sometimes be exempted from generally
applicable laws. And Congress, rather than the Court, will
retain the ultimate responsibility for the continuation and
interpretation of that decision.
Of course, the courts would apply the compelling interest
test under the Act, and judges would be required to balance the
importance of government policies against the burden on religious exercise. But striking this balance in the enforcement of a
statute is fundamentally different from striking this balance i n
the independent judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Under the statute, the judicial striking of the balance is not final.
If the Court strikes the balance in an unacceptable way, Congress can respond with new legislation. Congress may amend
RFRA to add specific protection for certain religious practices
despite the Court's finding of a compelling interest, or to repeal
statutory protection for certain religious practices despite the
Court's finding of no compelling interest.
Thus, RFRA would protect religious exercise that the Court
felt unable to protect on its own authority, and it would solve
the institutional problem that inhibited the Court from acting
independently. The difficulties the Court identified in Smith
are a perfect illustration of the need for independent power, i n
both the judiciary and the Congress, to enforce the Bill of
Rights.
Our Constitution addresses the Madisonian dilemma of
protecting the minority from the majority without subjecting
the majority to control by the minority. The Court's insulation
from the normal political processes is a n essential virtue in
protecting the minority. But in the difficult balancing of interests required by some free exercise cases, the Court now feels
the need for a majoritarian voice. Because of the size and diversity of the national polity, Congress can provide more reliable
majoritarian protection for individual rights than the states
can.
By creating judicially enforceable statutory rights, Congress can call on judicial powers that the Court feared to invoke on its own. Because the rights created would be statutory,
For a recent judicial explanation of this essential Madisonian idea, see City
116.
of Richmond v. J A . Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Congress can retain a voice that it could not have retained had
the Court acted on its own. By legislating generally, for all
religions, instead of case by case for particular religions, Congress can reduce the danger that it will not respond to the
needs of small or unpopular faiths. If the Court and Congress
cooperate in this way, then the oppression of small faiths need
not be, as the Court feared, an "unavoidable consequence of
democratic govern~nent."~~'
VIII. THEDANGEROF RFRA
The possibility of amendments to RFRA should be reassuring to a Court that doubts its own capacity to authoritatively
balance competing interests, but it is also the weak spot of the
legislation. Protection for religious liberty was placed in the
Constitution in order to insulate religious liberty from shifts in
political majorities. Making the protection statutory necessarily
subjects religious liberty to shifting political majorities. The
great danger is that in some time of public excitement, Congress may amend RFRA to deny protection t o an unpopular
religious practice, or that some interest group may successfully
demand an amendment denying protection t o any religious
practices that inconvenience or offend it. Congress should resist
such amendments; it should recognize that RFRA is a quasiconstitutional statute that should not be lightly amended. But
the danger of such amendments is real. This danger is not a
consequence of RFRA; it is a consequence of Employment Diuision v. Smith.ll8 Religious liberty was committed into the
hands of shifting political majorities precisely t o the extent that
the Court withdrew judicial protection under the Constitution.
But RFRA may aggravate the problem in one way. Once
RFRA is enacted, all cases will be litigated under the statute,
and the Court will have no occasion to reconsider Smith. If the
religious claim prevails under the statute, there will be no need
to reach the constitutional issue. If the religious claim does not
prevail under the statute, it cannot prevail under any plausible
constitutional test-not under Smith and not under the compelling interest test-so there is still no need to reconsider
Smith. RFRA may eliminate whatever chance exists of correcting the constitutional law of free exercise.
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Smith, 494 U.S.at 890.
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This is a cost to the proponents of religious liberty. But it
is not a large cost, because there is little near-term prospect
that the Court will reconsider Smith. All five members of the
Smith majority are still on the C~urt,''~
although one has announced his retirement.l2' Two of the dissenters have retired,12' and a third has announced his intention to retire
soon.'" Chief Justice RehnquistlB and Justices White,'*
st even^,'^^ and S ~ a l i a 'have
~ ~ voted for Smith or something
very like it more than once. Lawyers with religious liberty
claims have so far sought to fit within Smith rather than ask
the Court to overrule it. In the one free exercise case decided
since Smith,ln the Court found flagrant anti-religious discrimination, and therefore had no need t o reconsider Smith.
The two remaining Justices from the Smith minority adhered
to their position^,'^^ and Justice Souter wrote a long scholarly
concurrence, arguing that Smith had little precedential value
and that it should be reconsidered on the next appropriate
occasion.'" But six Justices appeared to treat Smith as settled law, without even a perfundory acknowledgment that this
was not the occasion to address the issues raised in Souter's
conc~rrence.'~~
This dictum should not be accepted as legitimately resolving the issue, or even as necessarily predicting
the future votes of all who joined it. But it appears that Smith
has six votes for now, and that it will still have five after Justice White's retirement.
President Clinton's nominees to the Court might be more
sympathetic t o civil liberties claims generally, and t o religious

119. Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, White, Stevens, & Kennedy, JJ.
120. Greenhouse, supra note 63.
121. Brennan & Marshall, JJ.
122. Blackmun Sees an End of His Career on Court, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993,
at 7.
123. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703-32 (1986) (plurality opinion); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (white, J., dissenting).
125. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262-63 & n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
126. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463, 2467 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
127. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993).
128. Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., joined by O ' C o ~ o r ,J., concurring in the judgment).
129. Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 2226.
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liberty claims in particular, but there is no guarantee. As Justice Stevens' vote in Smith illustrates, some civil libertarians
have a blind spot for religious liberty. Moreover, not all Justices who think Smith was wrong would necessarily vote to overrule it; a vote to overrule also depends on a Justice's theory of
stare decisis, and probably on just how obviously wrong he or
she thinks Smith is. Even assuming no blind spots, no stare
decisis, and no Presidential mistakes, it will take several
Clinton appointments to move the center of the Court, and it
might take several appointments to produce a majority for
overruling Smith. RFRA may cut off this speculative prospect
of overruling Smith, but that is a small cost to pay for certain
and immediate statutory protection for religious liberty.
The cost is merely theoretical until and unless RFRA is
amended to exclude some set of claims from the statute. But
such a n amendment would make the cost real and perhaps
onerous. Suppose for example that Congress amended RFRA to
exclude its application to any public school. Lawyers representing school children and their parents would then base their
arguments on the Constitution. To prevail, they would have to
persuade the Court to overrule Smith, and also persuade the
Court that the school's restriction on their clients' religious
exercise served no compelling interest. But the school would
argue that Congress's specific exclusion of schools from the
statute indicated a considered judgment by a co-equal branch
that suppression of religious minorities in the public schools is
necessary to the states' compelling interest in education. If the
Court treated this argument as plausible, the religious minorities might be worse off under RFRA as amended than they
would have been without RFRA a t all.
The danger of precluding reconsideration of the constitutional question is a strong reason for Congress to reject proposed amendments that would exclude religious claims. And if
Congress does enact such an amendment, courts should be
alert to the danger that the constitutional question will not be
fully considered in either branch. Courts should not assume
that a n amendment to RFRA represents a considered judgment
about the scope of religious liberty or about the government's
compelling interest in a particular context. Depending on its
political context, such an amendment may represent a wholly
unprincipled expression of temporary political passion, a tactical victory by some interest group or bureaucracy that placed
no value on the costs to religious liberty, or even a concession
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to such forces by legislators who hoped the courts would do the
right thing and turn to the Constitution to protect the affected
religious minorities.
Any such controversy is far in the hture, and its circumstances cannot be anticipated now, but two points are indisputable. First, RFRA does not repeal the Free Exercise Clause.
Second, the issue decided in Smith was neither presented nor
briefed by any party or amicus. If at some point in the future a
free exercise issue arises that is not covered by RFRA, the
constitutional issue will be open, and the Court should give it
full consideration.

IX. CONCLUSION
The generation that came of age in roughly the quartercentury after Brown u. Board of ducati ion'^' has too readily
assumed that only courts can protect constitutional liberty. But
part of the genius of separation of powers is that all three
branches can protect liberty when motivated to do so.lS2For
the last ten years or so, Congress has been more interested in
protecting liberty than the Court has been, and this pattern
may continue for some time into the future. One reading of the
current Court is that it is not hostile to liberty, but that it is
deeply committed to the view that Congress should take the
lead.
RFRA would be an exercise of congressional power to protect liberty in default of the Court's doing so on the direct authority of the Constitution. This protection would be applied to
cases in which the states, federal agencies, or even Congress
itself have burdened religious exercise without compelling necessity. Such a statute should not be viewed as an oddity.
Rather, it would be our constitutional and political system at
its best.
The Constitution embodies some of our highest ideals. It
makes those ideals judicially enforceable for fear that the political majority, in pursuit of self-interest or in succumbing t o
baser motives, will not always live up t o its ideals. The nation's
history of religious liberty and pluralism shows that the ideal
of religious liberty runs deep, and the history of religious bigotry and intermittent persecution shows that the tendency to
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For historical examples, see Laycock, supra note .50, at 1728-29.
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violate the ideal also runs deep. RFRA would be an example of
the majority acting to enforce a constitutional ideal, and that
could only be good for the constitutional system.

